公益研究

自愿监管日益成为各国政府监管非营利组织的重要工具。但关于非营利组织参与自愿监管的驱动机制还有待挖掘。本文结合并扩展了自愿监管和制度工作理论，探讨政府非正式关系工作对非营利组织参与自愿监管的影响。基于对深圳203家随机抽样的非营利组织进行的问卷调查和访谈，文章研究了中国政府主导的自愿评级体系，以及非营利组织对该体系的差异化接受度。实证分析表明，政治嵌入型非营利组织，即与地方政府存在紧密组织关联的非营利组织，更有可能参与评级。政府依赖既有监管网络在组织和个人层面开展关系工作来说服或劝导非营利组织参与，因此更倾向于将政治嵌入型非营利组织作为重点招募对象。然而，这种定向招募策略可能引发比单纯接受或拒绝更为复杂的组织反应，最终会促成一些非营利组织积极申请评级，而阻碍另一些非营利组织参与，从而影响自愿监管体系发挥作用。

Around the world,voluntary programs are an increasingly prevalent regulatory instrument in governing nonprofit organizations. But accounts of mechanisms driving nonprofits' participation in those programs are underdeveloped. This article combines and expands insights from voluntary regulation and institutional work theories to examine the impact of government's informal relational work on nonprofits' regulatory participation. Drawing on interviews and survey data from a random sample of 203 nonprofits in Shenzhen, China, the authors study the country's pioneering government-sponsored voluntary accreditation program and its varying receptions among nonprofits.The empirical analysis shows that politically embedded nonprofits,those with closer organizational connections with the local government,are more likely to participate in accreditation. Since government agencies rely on existing regulatory networks to conduct relational work at both organizational and personal levels to persuade or cajole nonprofits to participate,they tend to direct their recruitment efforts towards more politically embedded nonprofits. However,these targeted recruitment practices may generate reactions much more complicated than the dichotomy of acceptance versus resistance,which ultimately facilitates some nonprofits seeking accreditation while deterring others.